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DISJUNCTIONS AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN MARCUS AURELIUS  
 
In his Meditations, Marcus Aurelius repeatedly presents a disjunction between two 
conceptions of the natural world. Either the universe is ruled by providence or there are atoms.1 
At iv.3, we find perhaps its most succinct statement: ἀνανεωσάμενος τὸ διεζευγμένον τό· ἤτοι 
πρόνοια ἢ ἄτομοι (recall the disjunction: either providence or atoms). The formulation of the 
disjunction differs; at vii.32, being composed of atoms is contrasted with a stronger sort of 
unity (ἕνωσις) that may survive death. In X.6 and xi.18 Marcus simply offers φύσις (nature, 
construed in the Stoic manner as providentialist and causally efficacious) in opposition.2 On 
the surface, the contrast between the theory of atomism and the acceptance of providence seems 
to not warrant the term ‘disjunction’; it seems possible to accept both atomism and a causally-
determined, providential universe. Yet it is agreed on all sides, in the recent literature, that the 
relevant contrast for Marcus is not between the atomist and non-atomist views of the 
constitution of the natural world as such, but between two entailments that follow from the 
atomist Epicurean and non-atomist Stoic advocacy of these positions. The contrast is between 
the providential ordering of the Stoic universe and the chaotic, chance-ridden Epicurean model.  
The repeated invocation of the Epicurean view, Marcus’ hypothetical exploration of 
accepting such a model, and whether this would amount to any significant difference over that 
of other Stoics, has long led to questions about his commitment to orthodox Stoicism. John 
Cooper, for example, has argued that Marcus (along with Seneca to a certain extent) goes some 
way towards abandoning Stoicism for Epicureanism, particularly in the area of physics.3 This 
does not mean that Marcus abandons the personal equanimity and the commitment to virtue 
that characterise Stoic ethics, but it does suggest that such commitments are quite independent 
of his understanding of natural philosophy. Cooper concludes that Marcus’ entertaining of 
Epicurean atomism suggests a failure on his part to attend to Stoic theory assiduously enough 
to establish the grounding that would eliminate the Epicurean view from consideration in the 
first place. Marcus, it seems, abandons the hard-won Stoic practice of theoretical 
argumentation for a rhetorically-focussed, quasi-religious mode of self-persuasion.   
                                                 
1 iv.27, vi.10, vi.24, vi.44 vii.32, vii.50, ix.28, ix.39, x.6, xi.18. A similar disjunction is implied 
at vi.44 and viii.25.  
2 The disjunctions do not form a homogeneous group but are of several different types. This is 
explored further below.  
3 J. Cooper, ‘Moral Theory and Improvement: Marcus Aurelius’, in id., Knowledge, Nature, 
and The Good (Princeton, 2004), 335-68.  
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Similar worries have been expressed by John Rist.4 He sees Marcus as open to all 
natural principles or explanations, including those that are Epicurean, so long as they lead to 
his desired ethical conclusions, as guaranteed by providence. Ultimately, Rist’s Marcus is a 
man deeply ill at ease with the world, subject to a sceptical, Heraclitean view of the universe’s 
inherent instability, searching not for doctrine in Stoicism, but rather for something closer to 
philosophically-informed therapy suited to provide existential comfort.  
That Marcus did not merely veer away from what we might characterise as orthodox 
Stoic physics in favour of Epicureanism but had little understanding of, or interest in, the 
subject has long been suggested. Brunt, in his important study of the Meditations, puts this 
thought bluntly: ‘He (Marcus) has no use for syllogisms or inquiries into physical 
phenomena.’5 Certainly, as we shall see, Marcus does seem to provide explicit testimony that 
he is not concerned or perhaps able to pursue physics at the theoretical level nor to offer any 
innovations in the area.6   
A parallel lapse from Stoic orthodoxy has been noticed in Marcus’ comments on the 
tripartite division of the human person and its relation to his psychology. Sometimes this is a 
division into body, pneuma and the governing part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν);7 alternatively pneuma is 
replaced with the soul in a similar formulation.8 Marcus’ tendency to emphasise the governing 
part, and perhaps identify the self with it, has provoked charges of a flirtation of Platonism, 
possibly filtered through the ‘Middle’ Stoic Posidonius.9 Even a casual look at the Meditations 
                                                 
4 J. Rist, ‘Are You a Stoic’, in B.F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders (edd.), Jewish and Christian Self-
Definition: Volume 3 (London, 1982), 23-59.  
5 P.A. Brunt, ‘Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations’, JRS 64 (1974), 1-20, at 3, n.15, citing 
i.17.8 and viii.1.  
6 See vii.67, where Marcus appears to give up hope of becoming a φυσικός or a διαλεκτικός. 
We shall soon return to this passage.  
7 ii.2, cf. xii.3 where τὸ ἡγεμονικόν is replaced with νοῦς. See C. Gill, ‘Marcus Aurelius’ 
Meditations: How Stoic and How Platonic’, in M. Bonazzi and C. Helmig (edd.), Platonic 
Stoicism, Stoic Platonism (Leuven, 2007), 189-207. Gill provides an account of Marcus’ 
apparent flirtation with Platonist psychology that emphasises his Stoic credentials.  
8 iii.16, cf. vi.32. This circumscribed identification of pneuma with the soul and not as the 
divine power enabling the tensional hexis and individuating qualities of items in the world is 
itself somewhat at odds with orthodox Stoicism. See D. Sedley, ‘Marcus Aurelius on Physics’, 
in M. van Ackeren (ed.), A Companion on Marcus Aurelius (Malden, 2007), 396-407, at 397.  
9 See ii.2, iv.39, xi.19, in particular for Marcus’ identification. For the influence of Posidonius, 
see Rist (n.4), 31. Posidonius’ integration of Platonist elements with his philosophy is 
controversial. Galen (Hipp. et Plat. 460-1, Fr.160 Edelstein-Kidd) provides us with strong 
evidence for his acceptance of Plato’s tripartition of the soul. See A.E. Ju, ‘Stoic and 
Posidonian Thought in the Immortality of the Soul’, CQ 59 (2009), 112-24, for an account of 
Posidonius’ view of the soul’s post-mortem persistence.  
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suggests a focus on the negative aspects of the physical realities of lived experience and an 
emphasis on the governing part of the self. This is evident in a certain skepticism about the 
value of those things that appeal to the senses: Falernian wine, for example, is mere grape juice, 
luxurious purple fleece, the product of shellfish.10 How could Marcus so defiantly distance 
himself from the material world characterized, on the Stoic account, by an immanent 
rationality?11  
 These concerns have been raised often recently, and there is little in the above account 
that will not be familiar. Julia Annas provides a similar exposition and attempts to defuse 
objections to Marcus’ commitment to Stoicism, as it was practiced at Rome, by demonstrating 
how frequently he comes down on the side of providence in its disjunction with atomism, and 
how in keeping with Seneca a willingness to give Epicureanism a chance was.12 On Annas’s 
account, Marcus’ willingness to consider alternatives suggests an unusually strong 
commitment on his part to the power of the intellect: suspending physical and metaphysical 
grounding, Marcus only needs the functioning of reason to reach the Stoic conclusion of living 
in accordance with nature.13 In the end, Marcus’ open-ended consideration of non-Stoic 
physical claims serves to increase his confidence in Stoic ethical principles.  
 I suggest that Annas and others who have recently sought to defend Marcus’ 
commitment to mainstream Stoicism are largely right.14 My purpose here is not to offer a full-
                                                 
10 See P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel, M. Chase (trs.), (Cambridge, MA, 1998),165-8. Hadot finds 
one of his strongest pieces of evidence for the theory that the Meditations is a personal text 
intended as a series of therapeutic exercises at vi.13. Here Marcus seems to be advocating a 
method of eliminating excess pride and false beliefs in non-virtuous pursuits by examining the 
physical realities of things. This applies, mutatis mutandis, to those things that are unpleasant 
(vi.36). The point, as Hadot suggests, is that the process is intended to help overcome prejudices 
about the world.   
11 Marcus’ disgust with his own physicality is evident in a well-known passage from viii.24: 
Ὁποῖόν σοι φαίνεται τὸ λούεσθαι: ἔλαιον, ἱδρώς, ῥύπος, ὕδωρ γλοιῶδες, πάντα 
σικχαντά: τοιοῦτον πᾶν μέρος τοῦ βίου καὶ πᾶν ὑποκείμενον. 
12 J. Annas,‘Marcus Aurelius: Ethics and It Background’, Rhizai 2 (2004), 103-119, at 107-
114.  
13 See also E. Asmis ‘The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius’ in W. Haase and H. Temporini (edd.), 
Aufsteig und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, II, 36.3, (Berlin, 1989), 2228-2252, at 2252. 
Asmis, though, adopts an eclectic view of Marcus at odds with Annas’s presentation.  
14 See, for example, G. Gill, Marcus Aurelius: Meditations, Books 1-6 (Oxford, 2013), lxix-
lxxiv. Gill provides a very helpful overview, though no firm conclusion other than advocating 
against putting too much stress on these passages for the overall interpretation of the 
Meditations. See too Sedley (n.8), and T. Bénatouïl, ‘Theôria and scholê in Epictetus and 
Marcus Aurelius: Platonic, Stoic, or Socratic’, in A.G. Long (ed.), Plato and the Stoics 
(Cambridge, 2013), 147-173. Although I agree with Annas on Marcus’ general attitude towards 
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scale defence of these interpretations, but rather to suggest two theses that offer a more- 
nuanced take than has been previously offered on Marcus’ method of considering alternatives, 
most often formed as disjunctions, in the sphere of physics. (1.) I claim that we can determine 
that Marcus was in fact committed to enquiring more fully in keeping with the principles of 
orthodox Stoic natural philosophy than is usually accepted, even if this did not amount to any 
dedication to theoretical innovation. In conjunction with this, I will maintain that there is no 
reason to suggest Marcus seriously considers atomism, or any other theory of the natural world 
as true, apart from the Stoic view. Versions of this claim have been advanced, but I hope to 
show how Marcus’ use of disjunctions actually support such a thesis and does not undermine 
it. (2.) Following on from this, I submit that a recognizable philosophical method is at work in 
the frequent appeal to disjunctions. Strikingly, Marcus’ appeal to incompatible theses also 
appears in the area of psychology, sometimes embedded within the familiar disjunction 
between models of the natural world.15 We also find a similar treatment of competing views in 
intra-Stoic debates on ekpyrosis, the nature of providence, and the post-mortem existence of 
the soul.16 This ‘method’ combines elements of Marcus’ Meditations that have not received 
enough attention. I will suggest that construing Marcus’ use of disjunctions with reference to 
his understanding of Stoic contemplation helps to us to understand why he is apparently open 
to non-Stoic doctrines. Ultimately, the appearance of neutrality is a product of what I maintain 
is a general feature of the Meditations, and one that reflects their personal (self-directed 
character). This figures within the use Marcus might make of his own work, not just in its 
composition, but in its later study.17 Marcus’ disjunctions, on such an account, are incipient 
arguments, not fully fleshed out, but with enough pieces in place to suggest his ultimate 
direction and prompt further development.  
                                                 
Stoic physics, I offer quite a different reading of his approach to Epicureanism and a different 
solution to the most difficult group of disjunctions.  
15 Rist (n.4), 33 notes this connection. Hadot (n.10), 151-3 recognises the complexity of 
Marcus’ use of disjunctions by charting the further ‘sub-disjunctions’ generated in ix.28.2. My 
conclusions about the significance of this complex structure very much differ in so far as I do 
not accept Hadot’s identification of the parts of philosophy with the three Epictetan disciplines 
(τόποι), and thus do not think that Marcus’ disjunctive framework serves to reinforce the 
‘discipline of desire’ which Hadot identifies with physics.  
16 X.7, ix.28, and iv.21, respectively. On this point, see Gill (n.14), lxviii, and Sedley (n.8), 
405-406.  
17 One might think here of the Anaïs Nin’s widely quoted ‘we write to taste life twice, in the 
moment, and in retrospect’. The point is that we need to take into account how Marcus would 
have made use of his work after its composition.    
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 Of course, the precise use Marcus intended to make of the Meditations is not 
immediately obvious. Even if we were to accept Brunt’s case for seeing the work as a personal 
spiritual diary, the question of quite what use Marcus made of such a work is still left open.18 
I submit that Marcus’ focus on contemplation in the Stoic vein allows for a firmer 
understanding because it helps to illuminate how Marcus constructs a philosophical tool to 
alleviate both current and well as future suffering. On such an account, it is crucial that we 
understand the future-directed nature of Marcus’ discussion on the contemplative mode.   
 John Cooper has made the point that Marcus was a student of the conservative 
rhetorician, Marcus Cornelius Fronto, and that this rhetorical education helps to explain some 
of the argumentative formulations discernible in the Meditations.19 On this connection, I 
suggest a different reading: in his use of disjunctions in the area of physics, rhetorical training 
is being applied to a genuine philosophical end. There is an obvious objection here: Marcus is 
writing for himself, what is the use of rhetorical flourish in such a case? My suggestion is that 
Marcus’ rhetorically inspired disjunctions are aimed at his audience of one and need to be 
interpreted alongside his frequent appeal to memory.20 While it is common to interpret such 
appeals to memory as evidence of attempts at consolation in times of uncertainty, I will show 
that at least some of the appeals help to structure instances of contemplation, This is not to say 
that we should we think that these two purposes (contemplative and consolatory) are easily 
separated; on the account I propose, contemplation has a crucial role to play for Marcus in 
steadying the mind confronted with the vicissitudes of world and in pointing the way towards 
the Stoic view. With this in mind, the appearance of Epicurean atomism is less suggestive of 
Marcus’ eclecticism than of his attempts (however successful) to comes to grips with Stoic 
natural philosophy.    
   
MARCUS ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY  
                                                 
18 Brunt (n.5)  
19 Cooper (n.3), 366-8. 
20 That we have some 40 instances of Marcus telling himself ‘to always remember’ is frequently 
cited. See Brunt (n.5), 3, n. 18, and Rist (n.4), 24. In this respect, I find much to agree with in 
M. van Ackeren, Die Philosophe Marc Aurels. Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie 103/2, 2 
vols. (Berlin, 2011), 428-43. Van Ackeren’s view of the Meditations as a self-directed dialogue 
in which the form in which Marcus engages helps to structure his self-improvement project 
aligns closely with what I will argue. The crucial difference, however, is that I see no reason 
to explain away Marcus’ interaction with non-Stoic sources. The contemplative framework I 
suggest provides a justification for Marcus’ apparent receptivity.  
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 We may begin by getting to terms with what Marcus has to say about physics and its 
study. Perhaps the most common passage those who wish to deflate Marcus’ commitment to 
the study of natural philosophy cite is vii.67:  
μή, ὅτι ἀπήλπισας διαλεκτικὸς καὶ φυσικὸς ἔσεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπογνῷς καὶ ἐλεύθερος 
καὶ αἰδήμων καὶ κοινωνικὸς καὶ εὐπειθὴς θεῷ. 
Do not, because you have given up hope of being a thinker or student of science, on 
this account despair of being free, modest, sociable, and obedient to god.21  
 
The primary puzzle here is the scope of διαλεκτικός and φυσικός for Marcus. There is good 
reason to think they are used as success terms implying mastery of their respective subjects. 
We can confirm this by looking a few pages later in the Meditations where we find verbal 
forms of both within a demand to subject every φαντασία to scrutiny:  
διηνεκῶς καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης, εἰ οἶόν τε, φαντασίας φυσιολογεῖν, παθολογεῖν, 
διαλεκτικεύεσθαι.  
Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression, test it by natural 
science, by psychology, and by logic. (vii.13) 
 
Marcus clearly distinguishes between the possibility of the practice of physics from the 
attainment of expertise in the subject. It is also worth noting that the sort of ethical character 
he claims is possible for humans without expertise as both διαλεκτικός and φυσικός is not to 
be identified with the ideal Stoic life. Certainly, characteristics such as modesty and sociability 
are compatible with the Stoic ethical telos but none necessitates that we think Marcus is 
restricting his consideration here to something exclusively Stoic. With this in mind, we should 
be careful not to assume Marcus is claiming that one could fulfil the Stoic ethical ideal and be 
deficient in the mastery of logic and natural philosophy. 
This sort of distinction between an attempt itself and its successful practice is 
characteristic of the Meditations. Marcus, of course, nowhere claims he has achieved virtue 
and is careful to remind himself of his failings. At viii.1, we have an explicit testimony to this 
effect:  
ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτὸς σεαυτῷ δῆλος γέγονας πόρρω φιλοσοφίας ὤν. 
πέφυρσαι οὖν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν δόξαν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου κτήσασθαι οὐκέτι σοι ῥᾴδιον. 
To yourself as well as to many others it is plain that you fall far short of philosophy. 
And so you are marked, and it is no longer easy for you to acquire the reputation of a 
philosopher.  
 
                                                 
21 I follow Farquharson’s translation The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Oxford, 1944), with 
modifications throughout. Here I keep particularly close, though I take him to significant 
under-translate διαλεκτικός and φυσικός, to avoid tendentiousness.  
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We can see that Marcus is determined to distance his interest in philosophy from any claim 
that he has reached philosophical wisdom. Yet this need not entail that he has abandoned the 
pursuit of a philosophical life or that he supposed a philosophical life was possible without 
adequate mastery of such areas (and parts of Stoic philosophy) as logic and physics. This does 
not suggest that Marcus’ approach is innovative in pursuing a Stoic-like philosophy without 
their characteristic commitment to the integration of physics, ethics, and logic. Rather we find 
Marcus confronting his peculiar situation and the impossibility of being both philosopher and 
emperor.22   
 A second passage that suggests a prima facie rejection of the study of natural 
philosophy occurs towards the end of Book I. Here Marcus seems to suggest that he is pleased 
he did not concern himself with ‘problems above’:  
τὸ ὅπως ἐπεθύμησα φιλοσοφίας, μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν εἴς τινα σοφιστὴν μηδὲ ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ 
τὸ συγγράφειν ἢ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν ἢ περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ καταγίνεσθαι. πάντα 
γὰρ ταῦτα ῾θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται’.  
Although passionate about philosophy, I did not meet any sophist or retire to 
disentangle literary works or syllogisms or busy myself with problems ‘in the clouds’. 
For all these things require ‘the gods to help and Fortune’s hand’. (i.17.9) 
 
We find the association of logic with physics just as we saw above in Book VII and the same 
initial impression that Marcus is aiming to unshackle himself from these two parts of orthodox 
Stoic philosophy. But that would be too quick. Annas is right to note that all this passage 
commits Marcus to saying is that he is pleased he did not come upon the more abstruse aspects 
of philosophy first. This in no way entails he is pleased that he now still struggles with both 
logic and physics.23 There is quite an echo here of Aristophanes’ presentation of Socrates 
meteorologikos, so vigorously disputed in the Apology.24 Farquharson also points to the Stoic 
Aristo of Chios, a decisive early influence on Marcus, and his notorious claim that physics was 
beyond humans.25 Yet this misunderstands the force of Marcus’ point. Marcus may agree that 
the hurdle for the successful pursuit of the theoretical sciences is exceptionally high and that it 
requires god’s help and good fortune, but this suggests just the opposite of Aristo’s claim. 
When circumstances are right, such matters are implicitly affirmed to be within human reach.   
                                                 
22 Fronto reminds Marcus of this point (see Haines, ii 62). The difficulties of his duties as 
emperor are a frequent theme. Bénatouïl (n.14), 155 helpfully cites ii.1, vi.13, ix.36, and x.31.  
23 Annas (n.12),116, n.34.   
24 Plat. Apol. 18b-c, 19c, and 23d.  
25 Farquharson (n.20), 487. For Marcus’ response to Aristo’s philosophy, see Fronto (Haines, 
i 214-19). That it is the dissident Stoic that Marcus has in mind is agreed by most but not all. 
See Hadot (n.10), 12-14 for a defence and bibliography. For Aristo’s claim that physics is 
beyond human, see SVF 1.352.  
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 We can confirm this reading by appealing to another passage in which Marcus 
recommends looking up at the sky by quoting the Pythagoreans:  
Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι: ἕωθεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀφορᾶν, ἵν̓ ὑπομιμνῃσκώμεθα τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ 
αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον διανυόντων καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τῆς καθαρότητος 
καὶ τῆς γυμνότητος: οὐδὲν γὰρ προκάλυμμα ἄστρου.  
The Pythagoreans say: ‘Look up at the sky before morning breaks’, in order to remind 
ourselves of beings who always in the same relations and in the same way accomplish 
their work, and of their order, purity, and nakedness;26 for a star has no veil. (xi.27) 
 
That Marcus took such a practice to be a useful activity is confirmed by the clear echo of this 
formulation incorporating the early morning at the beginnings of Book II and V, used to 
summon a therapeutic, clarifying mode. Certainly, Marcus seems to treat Pythagoras as 
something of an authority. At vi.47, Pythagoras is grouped with two of the strongest non-Stoic 
influences on the school: Heraclitus and Socrates. The former is referenced repeatedly in the 
Meditations. At iv.46, Marcus urges himself to remember always what Heraclitus said and then 
proceeds to quote several of his fragments. Verbal echoes and allusions to the Presocratic are 
frequent and striking.27 We shall soon turn to a particularly suggestive passage on the subject 
of Stoic ekpyrosis. Little more needs to be said about the role of Socrates as the Stoics’ primary, 
pre-Zeno authority figure; the importance of both Heraclitus and Socrates is confirmed by 
Marcus at viii.3. This makes Pythagoras’ inclusion in this grouping suggestive and worth 
taking seriously.28 As such, the evidence of Book I is very far from confirming that Marcus 
had an aversion to natural philosophy.  
  We may say to conclude then that this initial examination evidences a reasonably 
strong familiarity with the fundamentals of Stoic natural philosophy, including the details of 
internal Stoic debates, as listed above. Perhaps this is an obvious point. Yet if we are to untangle 
                                                 
26 Marcus often uses the language of nakedness and of stripping things down to their essence. 
See iii.11, vi.13, x11.2, in particular. Gill (n.14), xli-xlii, makes this point.  
27 See, in particular, ii.17, iv.43, and ix.28. For a list of further references, see A.A. Long, 
‘Heraclitus and Stoicism’, in id., Stoic Studies, (Cambridge, 1996), 35-57, at 56-7. Long 
provides the classic account of the role of Heraclitus in the Stoic school. I have argued 
elsewhere the Heraclitus proved a decisive influence in helping to inform Cleanthes’ method 
of developing the foundation-stone of Stoic epistemology, the kataleptic impression. See, too, 
Asmis (n.13), 2246-9.  
28 Stoic interest in Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism as an important precursor to Plato has 
received a fascinating recent treatment by A.E. Ju, ‘Posidonius as Historian of Philosophy’ in 
M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC (Cambridge, 
2013), 95-117. She concludes that Posidonius sought out to examine the relationship between 
Platonic and Pythagorean thinking and that this allows him to recast his Platonic inheritance 
by mathematising it and, in doing so, he ‘endorsed Pythagoreanism as an august precedent.’    
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Marcus’ attitude to natural philosophy we need to eliminate once and for all the suggestion that 
it was ignorance that allowed for his apparent openness to Epicurean or Platonist positions.  
 
 
 
CONTEMPLATION AND MEMORY  
 We may profitably continue by drawing out a link between two elements of the 
Meditations that have not received much attention: contemplation (theoria) and memory. On 
the former, there has been a considerable effort to distinguish the views of Marcus, and the 
Stoics more generally, from the Platonists. Of course, there is an important question, which I 
will leave unanswered, about the role of contemplation in the virtuous life for the Stoics and 
how this might differ from the Platonist tradition.29 Our concern is more restricted: what is the 
place of natural philosophy in contemplative practice for Marcus, and what does this tell us 
about his characteristic use of disjunctions? It is memory and its invocation, I will suggest, that 
point to an answer.  
 First let us determine what contemplation is as it is presented in the Meditations. 
Thomas Bénatouïl has offered the following distinction between the objects of contemplation 
for Marcus and Epictetus and those for the Platonists: ‘Epictetus and Marcus do not 
contemplate at intelligible and eternal Forms but at the world, its causes, its structure and its 
evolution as laid down in Stoic physics.’30 This makes Marcus conform to orthodox Stoic 
practice and, as Bénatouïl suggests, helps to explain the difference between the cosmic 
perspective for Marcus and for Platonists.31 The aim of seeking out a global view of things32 
for Marcus is not to seek to transcend the individual’s perspective, as the Platonist might, but 
to enhance it by incorporating results of viewing the richness of the whole.33  
 Marcus clearly ascribes some importance to contemplation as a characteristic and 
essential feature of humankind. At viii.26, we find Marcus defining what is proper to humans 
as ‘kindness to his fellow man, disdain of the movements of the senses, to discern reliable 
                                                 
29 See, for example, E. Brown, ‘Contemplative Withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age’, 
Philosophical Studies 137 (2008), 79-89.  
30 (n.14), 157.  
31 See T. Bénatouïl, ‘θεωρία and βίος θεωπητικός from the Presocratics to the End of 
Antiquity: An Overview’, in T. Bénatouïl and M. Bonazzi (edd.), Theoria, Praxis, and the 
Contemplative Life after Plato and Aristotle (Leiden, 2012).  
32 See, for example, ix.30. 
33 Bénatouïl helpfully points to J. Sellars, The Art of Living, (Ashgate, 2003), 150-65.  
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impressions, to meditate on Universal Nature and the work of her hands.’34 This is in keeping 
with Diogenes Laertius’ depiction, at 7.130, of the relationship between the rational, practical, 
and theoretical lives for the Stoics. Yet what does contemplation consist in? Surely Bénatouïl 
is right about the scope of contemplative objects for Marcus, but we can discern a clearer 
depiction of its practice in the Meditations.  
 Contemplation and change are strongly connected in the Meditations. That 
contemplation should find its objects in the flux of the sensible world, of course, further 
distinguishes Marcus from Plato and the Platonists and recalls his appropriation of Heraclitus.35 
This second point is worth close inspection. Consider Marcus’ description of his contemplative 
method at x.11: 
Πῶς εἰς ἄλληλα πάντα μεταβάλλει, θεωρητικὴν36 μέθοδον κτῆσαι καὶ διηνεκῶς 
πρόσεχε καὶ συγγυμνάσθητι περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως μεγαλοφροσύνης 
ποιητικόν. 
Acquire a method of contemplation into the way all things change, one into another, 
attend continually to this part of Nature and exercise yourself in it, for nothing is so 
likely to promote an elevation of the mind.  
 
Here we find an emphasis on change as the proper object of contemplation cast in decidedly 
Heraclitean terms.37 We find a related appeal to the movements of the stars, similar to the 
Pythagorean passage quoted above, echoing the importance of elemental change and the ethical 
aim of contemplation, at vii.47.38 The influence of Heraclitus on this point is confirmed at iv.46 
in an especially important passage for our purposes: 
Ἀεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι γῆς θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι καὶ ὕδατος θάνατος 
ἀέρα γενέσθαι καὶ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ ἔμπαλιν.39 μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου, ᾗ 
ἡ ὁδὸς ἄγει· καὶ ὅτι, ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι, λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, τούτῳ 
διαφέρονται· καὶ οἷς καθ̓ ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται·40 καὶ ὅτι οὐ 
δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε δοκοῦμεν ποιεῖν καὶ 
                                                 
34 Εὐφροσύνη ἀνθρώπου ποιεῖν τὰ ἴδια ἀνθρώπου, ἴδιον δὲ ἀνθρώπου εὔνοια πρὸς τὸ 
ὁμόφυλον, ὑπερόρασις τῶν αἰσθητικῶν κινήσεων, διάκρισις τῶν πιθανῶν φαντασιῶν, 
ἐπιθεώρησις τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως καὶ τῶν κατ̓ αὐτὴν γινομένων. 
35 See Bénatouïl (n.14), 159-60, and R.B. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A 
Study (Oxford, 1989), 157-8.   
36 cf. Plut. Cic. 3.  
37 See, for example, DKB31, DKB76, and DKB90 on elemental transformation.  
38 Περισκοπεῖν ἄστρων δρόμους ὥσπερ συμπεριθέοντα καὶ τὰς τῶν στοιχείων εἰς ἄλληλα 
μεταβολὰς συνεχῶς ἐννοεῖν: ἀποκαθαίρουσι γὰρ αἱ τούτων φαντασίαι τὸν ῥύπον τοῦ χαμαὶ 
βίου. 
39 Heraclitus DKB36, cf. DKB76, and DKB77.   
40 Heraclitus DKB71 and DKB72.  
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λέγειν:41 καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὡς παῖδας τοκεώνων, τουτέστι κατὰ ψιλόν, καθότι 
παρειλήφαμεν.42 
Always remember what Heraclitus said: ‘the death of earth is the birth of water, the 
death of water is the birth of atmosphere, the death of atmosphere is fire, and 
conversely’. Remember, too, his image of the man who forgets the way he is going; 
and: ‘they are at variance with that with which they most continuously have converse 
(Reason which governs the universe), and the things they meet with every day appear 
alien to them’; and again: ‘we must not act and speak like men who sleep, for in sleep 
we suppose that we act and speak’; ‘we must not be like children with parents’, that is, 
accept things simply as we have received them. 
  
Many of the Heraclitean themes here are familiar from elsewhere in the Meditations: the reason 
that governs the universe43 and joins everyone in harmony (vii.13, ix.42), the deception of sleep 
(viii.12), and, of course, the elemental change that serves as the paradigmatic object of 
contemplation. While these Heraclitean reminiscences and quotations are standardly noted, 
quite what role they serve for Marcus needs exploration. In short: Why does Marcus remind 
himself to ‘always remember what Heraclitus had said’?  
 We have already noted the frequency of these appeals to memory, often in the 
imperative mood. They are easily taken to reflect moments of self-reproach or attempts to calm 
an anxious mind. Indeed such a view is very much in keeping with the interpretation of Marcus’ 
apparent receptivity to Epicurean or Platonist doctrines as his default positions, serving to 
suggest the ethical results of accepting either the Stoic or non-Stoic views. Yet there is another 
possibility worth investigating: the appeals to memory are reminders with less obvious or 
immediate self-therapeutic value, but rather more use as indicators of a collection of 
philosophical antecedents and arguments that might serve as exegetical and argumentative 
tools for use in future reflection. What I have in mind is that Marcus’ appeals to memory might, 
in certain instances, serve as attempts to outline for himself how he might address philosophical 
questions by beginning from Heraclitus. The overwhelming emphasis on Heraclitus in Marcus’ 
discussion of contemplation suggests the former’s foundational role.   
                                                 
41 Heraclitus DKB73.  
42 Heraclitus DKB74, cf. DKB70 and DKB79 
43 λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι is, no doubt, a Stoic gloss and not a part of a verbatim quotation 
from Heraclitus; see C.H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, (Cambridge, 1979), 104. 
The notion of logos as a governing principle harmonizing opposites is far more akin to its Stoic 
conception. Yet we are primarily concerned with what Marcus took to be Heraclitean, and not 
with what we can safely ascribe to the earlier figure from our vantage point. With this in mind, 
it seems reasonable to assume that Marcus’ gloss represents his understanding of what 
Heraclitus said and thought. That the Stoics took their notion of the logos to overlap 
significantly, if not fully, with that of Heraclitus, see Long (n.26), 51.  
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 Marcus’ use of the image of a river in flux is good evidence of the use of Heraclitus as 
a philosophical antecedent with value. Immediately before the quotations of Heraclitus given 
in iv, Marcus offers (iv.43) the violent torrent of a river as an analogy for the inexorable passing 
of time (ῥεῦμα βίαιον ὁ αἰών). This image of the river’s flux as a poignant metaphor for life is 
found again at ii.17, in a strongly Heraclitean passage,44 and does real work for Marcus by 
helping to demonstrate that the philosophical life is the only one suited to keep one’s daimon 
intact.  
 Vi.15 presents a similar conclusion, i.e. that human life is subjected to continuous 
vicissitudes, but within a more complex appropriation of Heraclitean material. A version of the 
river saying is quoted (ἐν δὴ τούτῳ τῷ ποταμῷ, ἐφ̓ οὗ στῆναι οὐκ ἔξεστιν),45 and this is 
connected with the continuous flux of respiration: 
τοιοῦτον δή τι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἑκάστου, οἷον ἡ ἀφ̓ αἵματος ἀναθυμίασις καὶ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ 
ἀέρος ἀνάπνευσις: ὁποῖον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἅπαξ ἑλκύσαι τὸν ἀέρα καὶ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅπερ 
παρέκαστον ποιοῦμεν, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ τὴν πᾶσαν ἀναπνευστικὴν δύναμιν, ἣν χθὲς 
καὶ πρῴην ἀποτεχθεὶς ἐκτήσω, ἀποδοῦναι ἐκεῖ ὅθεν τὸ πρῶτον ἔσπασας. 
Truly the life of every man is itself as fleeting as the exhalation of spirit from his blood 
or the breath he draws from the atmosphere. For just as it is to draw in a single breath 
and return to it, which we do every moment, so it is to render back the whole power of 
respiration, which you acquired but yesterday or the day before, at birth, to that other 
world which from which you first drew it in. 
 
Such a connection has a thoroughly Stoic antecedent in Cleanthes’ quotation of Heraclitus’ 
B12 for the sake of illuminating Zeno’s view of the soul.46 There the aim is to explain the 
soul’s receptivity to sense data and the necessary conditions for the operation of the kataleptic 
impression. This is achieved by conceiving of the soul as a vapour allowing its continuous 
impressibility to sense data. Here, Marcus is exploiting the same connection between 
respiration and Heraclitus’ river to make his point about the deceptive value of vulgar praise.47  
Yet it is striking that elements of Stoic doctrine are visible without obvious explanations 
for their presence. Exhalation of vapour from the blood, which contains πνεῦμα, is part of Stoic 
orthodox psychology and is understood as the nourishing process of the soul; Galen attributes 
such a view to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.48 Galen also confirms Marcus’ two-fold 
                                                 
44 ὁ δὲ βίος πόλεμος, cf. DKB48, DKB53, and DKB80.  
45 cf. Plutarch’s quotation of the fragment (DKB91).  
46 SVF i.141.  
47 That the Stoics would find a natural connection between questions of psychology and 
respiration in Heraclitus is suggested by Aristotle’s remark at De anima 405a25-27: ‘Heraclitus 
too says that the arche is soul, since it is vapour from which everything is composed. And it is 
very rarefied and in ceaseless flux.’   
48 SVF i.140.  
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process of exhalation from both the blood and from the atmosphere.49 There is also an allusion 
apparent at the conclusion of the quoted passage to a baby’s first breath.  This seems to point 
to the Stoic doctrine of the development of the foetus from dense πνεῦμα early in gestation to 
a lighter, ensouled human at birth after contact with cooler atmospheric air.50 
What is the relevance of these allusions for the purpose of making sense of Marcus’ 
treatment of Stoic physics? We can get a sense of Marcus’ strategy if we look at the passages 
that surround the quoted section. At vi. 14, Marcus provides a scala naturae of those things 
people admire in nature, giving a spectrum of entities individuated by their particular hexeis. 
Marcus moves from the inorganic, through the animal, before arriving at the human. The aim 
is to suggest that, when one recognizes the value of the highest kind, one is no longer interested 
in the lower orders.51 The discussion is Stoic, but seems to be somewhat anomalous, as 
Christopher Gill notes.52 While vi.14 seems to suggest the sort of ‘essentialist’ move familiar 
in Plato and Aristotle, in which the highest part of the human being is identified as the essential 
part, Marcus seems to be adopting a different strategy. Vi.16, though not noted by Gill, makes 
this particularly clear. There respiration (τὸ διαπνεῖσθαι) and, crucially, the ability to receive 
sense impressions (τὸ τυποῦσθαι κατὰ φαντασίαν) are not worthy of applause or glory. These 
functions are shared by mere beasts. What is to be valued is understanding yourself, thus 
making yourself acceptable to yourself, your peers, and in relation to the gods.53  
There is a clear allusion to the Stoic doctrine of social oikeiosis, or ethical development. 
What interests Gill is that Marcus appears not to argue from facts about our nature, as might 
be expected, but seems to problematise those very facts: ‘Instead of using the characterisation 
of our nature to provide an ontological basis for ethical claims, [it] suggests that statements 
about our nature can only take us a certain distance in ethical guidance.’54    
  It is certainly true that Marcus is offering an ethical conclusion here, and he does so by 
appealing to what makes humans unique on the scala naturae and not to what they share with 
the lower orders. I doubt, though, that this makes Marcus any less essentialist about human 
nature. There is a gap, as Gill stresses, between bare descriptions of human capacities and the 
                                                 
49 On Hippocrates’ Epidemics VI 270.26-8 (SVF 2.782, LS 53E). 
50 See Hierocles, Elements of Ethics 1.15-27. Plut. Stoic. Repugn. 1052ff., attributes such a 
view to Chrysippus.   
51 ὁ δὲ ψυχὴν λογικὴν καθολικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν τιμῶν οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστρέφεται. 
52 (n.7), 200-207.  
53  ἡ δὲ τῆς ἰδίας διανοίας αἰδὼς καὶ τιμὴ σεαυτῷ τε ἀρεστόν σε ποιήσει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς 
εὐάρμοστον καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς σύμφωνον.  
54 (n.7), 205-06.  
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proper exercise of those capacities in the pursuit of virtue. Yet the fact that humans are able to 
exercise them appropriately, according to nature, is just as much an essential fact as their 
existence. What really makes Marcus’ strategy differ from the familiar approach apparent in 
Plato and Aristotle,55 is a far more fine-grained distinction between mental capacities and their 
possessors. At vi.16, Marcus dismisses the mere fact of the capacity to receive sense-
impressions as shared with beasts. Iii.16 repeats this theme but adds the immoral humans, 
Phalaris and Nero, to the list. In this respect, Marcus adds the requirement of the proper exercise 
(and not merely the possession) of essential human capacities to restrict the highest order of 
his scala to the sage alone. The capacities of human qua human are no longer the top of the 
scala, but this makes it no less an essentialist picture. In fact, the exercise of intellectual virtue, 
as the crucial essential capacity of the sage, is depicted in vi.15. 
What we find in vi.15 is a picture of intellectual capacities, in action, in the form of 
contemplation, as Marcus understands it. Marcus begins from Herclitean flux, the paradigm 
object of contemplation on his account, as we have seen above, to which is added elements of 
Stoic orthodoxy arranged with a clear ethical focus. These pieces are presented as the tools 
Marcus uses to think with. It is this functional characteristic of his appropriation of Heraclitus 
that is paramount. Heraclitus and those elements of Stoic physical theory are employed to 
clarify his thoughts about the value of praise and glory and to serve the explicit purpose of 
theoria on his account: the elevation of the mind (μεγαλοφροσύνη).56 The repetition of the 
scala naturae motif in vi.16 confirms this role and suggests how the contemplation 
demonstrated in vi.15 fits within Stoic social and ethical development. It is in assigning the 
greatest value to this highest activity that makes one progress in relation to oneself, one’s 
community, and the gods. Contemplation, its proper object found in the flux of natural world, 
is contributory to concept of oikeiosis and forms part of its implementation.  
My suggestion is that in these passages, suggested by the appeal to Heraclitus, and 
confirmed by his insistence at the end of vi.16 of the value of διανοία,57 we find out how 
                                                 
55 Gill mentions the Alcibiades (128e-130c), the Republic (611d-612a), and the Phaedo (68a-
69d, 78d-84b). He considers this feature in Aristotle in his Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, 
and Philosophy (Oxford, 1996), 356-383.  
56 cf. x.11 and iii.11. While the latter does not specifically mention theoria, the process 
described there (methodically examining each thing one encounters and its relationship to the 
cosmos as a whole) makes it clear that the process imagined of elevating one’s mind is the 
largely the same.  
57 cf. ix.29: χειμάρρους ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία: πάντα φέρει… μὴ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε, 
ἀλλὰ ἀρκοῦ, εἰ τὸ βραχύτατον πρόεισι, καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔκβασιν ὡς μικρόν τί ἐστι 
διανοοῦ. 
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Marcus means to incorporate orthodox Stoic ideas within his particular version of how to 
contemplate and make sense of the natural world. These ideas function as means that aid 
Marcus’ overall project in the Meditations, namely that of self-improvement by reflection.58 
Crucially, we see Marcus exploring the ethical implications of features of the Stoic worldview 
and the process of shaping his argument is visible We find nothing like a polished version of 
an argument, but something much closer to a record of a thought process, useful for later 
elaboration of the theme, even if Marcus is writing only for himself.  
 
COTEMPLATION, PROVIDENCE, AND ATOMS 
 If contemplation is properly directed at the changing world on Marcus’ account, the 
frequent disjunction between providence and atoms (offering contrasting models of the natural 
world) seems to fall within its scope. The alternatives of the disjunction set out the competing 
and, apparently, the exhaustive and exclusive, interpretations of what change in the world 
ultimately amounts to. That the themes of death and the resulting fate of its subject frequently 
stimulate the providence/atoms disjunction suggests this point.59 Annas takes this connection 
to support her claim that Marcus in interested in isolating the ethical upshot of either the 
Epicurean or the Stoic view. It is this point that interests Marcus, as it suggests no obstacle to 
his Stoic credentials.60 There is something to be said for this view: Marcus does explicitly 
appeal to instances of local agreement. At ix.41, for instance, Marcus approves of Epicurus’ 
equanimity in the face of disease and notes that it is an ideal in all the schools to maintain one’s 
commitment to the philosophical project, even in adversity.61 
 Yet, as has often been noted, the providence/atoms disjunctions are not all of one type, 
and there are instances where the explanations of local agreement or an obvious commitment 
to the Stoic view62 are insufficient. Strikingly, in at least two cases the governing disjunction 
of atoms or providence is associated with further sub-disjunctions in which points of intra-
Stoic debate are canvassed. If we keep in mind the role of Marcus’ contemplative method, as 
illustrated in vi.14-16, we can begin to see how these pieces fit together.  
                                                 
58 I take it that this is complementary with Gill’s understanding of the Meditations as 
combining, at a fundamental level, the twin themes of ethical self-improvement and the 
transient flux of human nature, particularly in relation to death: (n.14), xxxiv-lii.   
59 cf. ii.11, vi.10, vi.24, vii.32, and viii.25.  
60 (n.12), 108-10.  
61  ταὐτὰ οὖν ἐκείνῳ, ἐν νόσῳ, ἐὰν νοσῇς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ περιστάσει: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀφίστασθαι 
φιλοσοφίας ἐν οἷς δήποτε τοῖς προσπίπτουσι μηδὲ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ἀφυσιολόγῳ συμφλυαρεῖν, πάσης 
αἱρέσεως κοινόν. πρὸς μόνῳ τῷ νῦν πρασσομένῳ εἶναι καὶ τῷ ὀργάνῳ, δἰ οὗ πράσσεις. 
62 iv.27 and xi.18.   
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That contemplation, in Marcus’ sense, bears on the providence/atoms disjunction may 
be further gleaned from viii.25-6. In chapter 25, we seem to find an open-ended opposition of 
the two alternative world-views, after Marcus has listed the recently dead. On Annas’s view, 
the passage is intended to isolate the ethical implication of death that nothing personal survives 
and we must act accordingly, a point of agreement between the Stoics and Epicureans:  
τούτων οὖν μεμνῆσθαι ὅτι δεήσει ἤτοι σκεδασθῆναι τὸ συγκριμάτιόν σου ἢ σβεσθῆναι 
τὸ πνευμάτιον ἢ μεταστῆναι καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ καταταχθῆναι. 
Keep these facts in mind, that your own frame is bound to be scattered into atoms63 or 
your spirit extinguished or to change its place and be stationed elsewhere.  
 
The atomist view here is contrasted with two Stoic views on the survival of the soul after death 
(either immediate extinction or temporary survival).64 Annas’s view is plausible enough, but I 
would like to suggest an alternative account. The mention of memory here (μεμνῆσθαι) does 
seem to fit the comforting, therapeutic reading of such appeals discussed above. Yet this does 
not account for Marcus’ sub-disjunction of competing Stoic positions and, significantly, 
Marcus’ account of contemplation in the very next line of the text, in 26. Viii.26 is separated 
out as a new chapter but taking it closely with 25 makes good sense.  
Let us look at this passage again: 
A man’s joy is to do what is proper to man, and man’s proper work is kindness to his 
fellow man, disdain of the movements of the senses, to discern reliable impressions, to 
meditate on Universal Nature and the work of her hands.65 
 
The distinction made between reliable impressions and the mere movement of the senses 
provides our first clue. This points to one of the primary challenges of the Stoic conception of 
contemplation. The Platonist can simply ignore the senses and aspire to transcend them through 
the contemplation of eternal, unchanging entities.66 However, the Stoic sage, committed to the 
Stoic criterion of truth grounded in the kataleptic impression, cannot avoid sense perception, 
but must determine what is valuable and what is irrelevant noise. The connection, examined 
                                                 
63 While it is true that atoms are not explicitly mentioned here, there is every reason to believe 
the atomist world-view is what Marcus has in mind. A parallel use of σκεδάννυσθαι is found 
within the atoms/providence disjunction at vi.4; σκεδάσμός occurs within such a disjunction 
vi.10, vii.32, and x.7.  
64 cf. iv.21.  
65 Εὐφροσύνη ἀνθρώπου ποιεῖν τὰ ἴδια ἀνθρώπου, ἴδιον δὲ ἀνθρώπου εὔνοια πρὸς τὸ 
ὁμόφυλον, ὑπερόρασις τῶν αἰσθητικῶν κινήσεων, διάκρισις τῶν πιθανῶν φαντασιῶν, 
ἐπιθεώρησις τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως καὶ τῶν κατ̓ αὐτὴν γινομένων. 
66 Sedley (n.8), 399 helpfully notes the first chapter of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos 152.10-11, 
where the objects of knowledge are explicitly said to be intelligible and fundamentally stable. 
This Platonist position, then, is directly at odds with Marcus’ view of the transience of ousiai.  
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above, between contemplation and elemental change confirms such the centrality of 
appropriately mediated sense impression.   
We can apply this framework to the disjunction of viii.25. Marcus appeals to memory 
to summon up his familiar opposition between providence and atoms with the aim of 
contrasting what seems to be the case to the mere movement of the senses (atomism) and what 
is true upon reflection on nature and what happens in its accordance (providence). Of course, 
this is not to say that Marcus claims that atomism, as such, appears to be true on the evidence 
of unreflective sense experience. It is what atomism entails: chaos and instability. This point is 
made repeatedly.67 Thus we might qualify the relevant implications of Marcus’ use of his 
familiar disjunction. Ultimately, the contrast is between a view of nature that is teleologically 
governed and one that is not. The latter, which Marcus associates with the results of bare or 
mere sense experience, is firmly placed in the atomist camp. It is not change per se that Marcus 
associates with an atomist world-view, but chaotic, non-purposive change.   
In fact, we might go further and say that those appearances of chaos and instability, 
which Marcus understands as the product of experiencing human life, is what he takes the 
atomist to be committed to even after subjecting the results of sense experience to rational 
testing. The work of the Meditations is an effort to eliminate the seemingly incorrigible beliefs 
produced by sense experience, i.e. the appearances of randomness and flux that ultimately 
support an atomistic, non-teleological view of the universe. In this category, we may place 
Marcus’ well-known passages expressing disgust and boredom (iv.48, v.32, vi.13, vi.46, 
viii.24, ix.36). The constant instability and flux, with its analogy in Heraclitus’ river, continues 
the theme.68 The Heraclitean pedigree goes even deeper. At vi.42, Marcus quotes Heraclitus 
(B75, unattested elsewhere) to the effect that those asleep are fellow workers in what comes to 
pass according to providence. This echoes Heraclitus’ B1 and suggests that we are all subject 
to providence and are partners in its operation, even if we fail to notice it in action. For Marcus, 
the instability of the world, as it appears to our senses, attests to the truth of atomism; the 
chaotic fleetingness of life suggests the Epicurean position. Yet, on reflection, we can see that 
providence holds sway.69 The disjunction is not simply an opposition made between the 
conclusions of two philosophical schools, but a contrast to be found within Marcus’ own 
experience of the world at two distinct levels.  
                                                 
67 See, for example, iv.3, vi.10, vi.24,  
68 Rist (n.4), 36-9 takes the pessimism this entails to be the primary instance of Heraclitus’ 
influence on Marcus’ worldview.  
69 Cf. iv.10.  
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 This suggests a different reading of Marcus’ seeming openness to the Epicurean line in 
viii.25. Rather than seeking ethical convergence, Marcus is setting up the terms of the process 
of contemplation, the activity that seeks to elevate the mind by isolating the evidence for 
providence that is made clear in the world only when the human mind’s capacity for reason 
(understood as discerning reliable sense impressions) is activated. Marcus appeals to memory 
to situate the opposed positions. Different Stoic conclusions are canvassed; the tools are 
brought to bear to achieve the μεγαλοφροσύνη Marcus aims to achieve.  
 What I am claiming is that we should take contemplation for Marcus to occupy an 
important position distinct from, and to be contrasted with, the Platonist and the Epicurean 
views. Contemplative activity provides the means of drawing out reliable knowledge of 
nature’s providential ordering. This can only be accomplished by addressing the evidence of 
the senses, unlike the Platonist, but also by allying such evidence to trustworthy impressions 
and Stoic doctrine, unlike the Epicurean. Marcus is, of course, presupposing the truth of Stoic 
doctrine in this process, yet there is a crucial difference between knowing something to be true 
and knowing how to respond to the barrage of sense impressions that call one’s commitment 
to Stoic truth into question. Contemplation, for Marcus, bridges this gap.   
 We find a similar embedding of an intra-Stoic debate within a governing 
providence/atoms disjunction in x.5-7, conforming to a strikingly similar strategy. This is one 
of the more difficult instances of the disjunction to construe without accepting that Marcus was 
genuinely open to Epicureanism.70 Yet we shall see that this is an unnecessary concession.  
 X.6 begins:  
Εἴτε ἄτομοι εἴτε φύσις, πρῶτον κείσθω ὅτι μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὅλου ὑπὸ φύσεως 
διοικουμένου: ἔπειτα, ὅτι ἔχω πως οἰκείως πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ μέρη. 
Whether there are atoms or Nature, the first postulate must be: ‘I am part of the whole 
which is governed by nature’; the second: ‘I am allied in some way to the parts that are 
of the same kind with me.’  
 
The text here may be corrupt; Marcus seems to take up immediately the providentialist view 
and to ignore the initial disjunction. I follow Farquharson in taking chapter 6 to correspond to 
the second half of the disjunction (εἴτε φύσις) and chapter 7.2 to follow on from the first (εἴτε 
ἄτομοι). While Farquharson is certainly correct to read these two chapters as continuous, the 
role of the disjunction in the line of thought needs further investigation. One suggestion, made 
                                                 
70 See Gill (n.14), lxxii.  
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by J. Leopold and followed by Sedley,71 is to take the disjunction to conclude chapter 5 to be 
read as follows: 
ὅ τι ἄν σοι συμβαίνῃ, τοῦτό σοι ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατεσκευάζετο καὶ ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν 
αἰτίων συνέκλωθε τήν τε σὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐξ ἀιδίου καὶ τὴν τούτου σύμβασιν, εἴτε 
ἄτομοι εἴτε φύσις.  
Whatever befalls you was prepared for you beforehand from eternity and the thread of 
causes was spinning from everlasting both your existence and this which befalls you, 
whether there are atoms or nature.  
 
This seems to face the same difficulty of outright contradiction as the positioning of the 
disjunction at the start of 6. Marcus is insisting on a predetermined causal nexus cast before 
one’s birth and explanatory of everything that happens in one’s life. This is far from the 
Epicurean atomist chaos which guarantees human free will and characterises Marcus’ 
understanding of their model of the natural world.72 Rather we seem to find a deterministic sort 
of atomism implied by Marcus’ presentation. This, by itself, might suggest we keep the 
disjunction at the start of chapter 6, even if it means assuming some text has been lost. I suggest, 
on the contrary, that it makes best sense of Marcus’ argument in chapter 5 to 7 to assume he 
had such a restricted, non-Epicurean form of atomism in mind. Indeed I submit that it is a 
version of Democritus’ atomism that is assumed from chapter 5 onwards.  
 First let us determine how chapter 6 develops from 5. In the earlier chapter, Marcus 
announces his theme of cosmic determination. In 6 and 7, the proper response to the inevitable 
destruction of the both the individual and the cosmos is developed. In this effort, we find 
Marcus addressing his standard topic of the relation of the human being to nature construed as 
that of a part to a whole. This has the familiar ethical conclusion of equanimity in the face of 
apparent adversity deriving from the following two postulates: nothing that benefits the whole 
injures the part and the whole never injures itself.73 The proper ethical response to the fear of 
the destruction of death is thus developed and justified.  
The theme continues in the first section of chapter 7 in which the necessity of the 
destruction of the whole is outlined, i.e. the Stoic conflagration. Marcus is at pains to dismiss 
the possibility that such destruction entails some evil done to the parts but not the whole. A 
destructive dilemma between two per impossibile sources of the introduction evil into the 
cosmos (either evil arrives according to φύσις or without its knowledge) is canvassed.  
                                                 
71 Sedley (n.8), 405, n.2.  
72 See, for example, vi.10.  
73 This is reminiscent of the familiar Stoic argument that the whole is never inferior to its parts 
(S.E. M. 9.85).  
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Up to this point, the argument is clear enough, although we have yet to see the relevance 
of chapter 5. It is in the second section of chapter 7 that the main difficulty is to be found but 
also where we begin to see how these chapters are unified.74 In the following, I provide 
Farquharson’s text and translation with a division into the three sections which I take to mirror 
the run of Marcus’ argument. 
(1) εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀφέμενος τῆς φύσεως κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι ταῦτα ἐξηγοῖτο, καὶ ὣς 
γελοῖον ἅμα μὲν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου μεταβάλλειν, ἅμα δὲ ὡς ἐπί τινι 
τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμβαίνοντι θαυμάζειν ἣ δυσχεραίνειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς διαλύσεως 
εἰς ταῦτα γινομένης, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον συνίσταται. (2) ἤτοι γὰρ σκεδασμὸς στοιχείων, ἐξ 
ὧν συνεκρίθη, ἢ τροπὴ τοῦ μὲν στερεμνίου εἰς τὸ γεῶδες, τοῦ δὲ πνευματικοῦ εἰς τὸ 
ἀερῶδες, ὥστε καὶ75 ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν τοῦ ὅλου λόγον, εἴτε κατὰ περίοδον 
ἐκπυρουμένου εἴτε ἀιδίοις ἀμοιβαῖς ἀνανεουμένου. (3) καὶ τὸ στερέμνιον δὲ καὶ τὸ 
πνευματικὸν μὴ φαντάζου τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως: πᾶν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐχθὲς καὶ τρίτην 
ἡμέραν ἐκ τῶν σιτίων καὶ τοῦ ἑλκομένου ἀέρος τὴν ἐπιρροὴν ἔλαβεν: τοῦτο οὖν ὃ 
ἔλαβε μεταβάλλει, οὐχ ὃ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτεκεν. ὑπόθου δ̓ ὅτι ἐκείνῳ σε λίαν προσπλέκει τῷ 
ἰδίως ποιῷ, οὐδὲν ὄντι οἶμαι πρὸς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. 
(1) But now suppose one dispensed with nature and expounded facts by way of ‘natural 
law’; how absurd it is in one breath to assert that the parts of the whole change by 
natural law, and in the same moment to be surprised or indignant as though at an 
occurrence in violation of natural law, particularly when the dissolution of each is 
taking place into the elements out of which each is composed. (2) For this dissolution 
is either dissipation of the atoms out of which they were compounded or else a turning 
of the solid into the earthy and of the vital spirit into its airy part, so that these too are 
caught up into the reason of the whole, whether the whole returns periodically to fire 
or is renewed by eternal exchanges. 
 (3) And do not imagine this solid body and this vital spirit to be that of its 
original entry into existence, for all this it took in only yesterday or the day before, an 
influx from food stuffs and the atmosphere which is respired; what is changing then is 
what it took in, not what its mother brought into the world. And even suppose that what 
is changing binds you intimately to the individual self, that is in fact nothing, I think, 
to affect my present argument.   
 
Section (1), if we adopt Farquharson’s text, takes up the second half of the opening, governing 
disjunction of chapter: ἄτομοι. We expect Marcus to explore the incessant flux and randomness 
suggested by this (i.e. atomism) and to use this to contrast the beneficent part/whole 
relationship supposed by the Stoic providentialist system. Yet we find a different criticism 
mounted: the atomist is self-contradictory in accepting natural law (as Farquharson translates 
                                                 
74 Farquharson (n.21), 824-831 details the issues and scholarly controversies of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries related to this passage. Most we may safely set aside.  
75 Elemental transformations, in addition, are caught up in τὸν τοῦ ὅλου λόγον. What are they 
in addition to? I suggest it is the dissolved atoms themselves, as will become clearer below; 
however, it is somewhat opaque how those that take the view that Epicurean atomism is in 
mind here could construe this in their favour, unless we were to take this phrase in a remarkably 
weak manner.  
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κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι) while also responding angrily to nature’s law when complex compounds 
are dissolved according to its rule. The temptation, I suppose, is to take the criticism as an ad 
hominem sort aimed at weak-willed Epicureans faced with death.76 Yet such a reading is both 
deeply unfair to the Epicureans and a poor fit for the sense of Marcus’ distinction between 
φύσις and τὸ πεφυκέναι.  
 Rather Marcus’ point is that a certain atomist view properly adopts causal determinism 
but fails to carry it through to the extent needed to realise its ethical benefits. Thus its adherents 
are left with an impersonal, naturalistic principle of explanation, but also explicitly one that 
fails to have the desired ethical dimension which alleviates the anger and indignant response 
such an atomist has to death. Taking the opening disjunction with chapter 5 supports this 
reading and makes Democritean atomism the prime candidate for what Marcus has in mind.  
 A comparison of chapter 5 with Ps.Plutarch’s well-known testimonium of Democritus’ 
determinism yields striking results: 
μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν τὰς αἰτίας τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων, ἄνωθεν δ’ ὅλως ἐξ ἀπείρου 
χρόνου προκατέχεσθαι τῆι ἀνάγκῃ πάνθ’ ἁπλῶς τὰ γεγονότα καὶ ἐόντα καὶ ἐσόμενα. 
The causes of the things that now come about have no beginning, but absolutely 
everything that has come about and is coming about and will come about is totally 
governed in advance by necessity from eternity. (Strom. 7) 
 
ὅ τι ἄν σοι συμβαίνῃ, τοῦτό σοι ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατεσκευάζετο καὶ ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν 
αἰτίων συνέκλωθε τήν τε σὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐξ ἀιδίου καὶ τὴν τούτου σύμβασιν, εἴτε 
ἄτομοι εἴτε φύσις. (x.5) 
 
The very same insistence on the eternity of causes and the predetermined character of 
everything that ever occurs is common to both and is found within notably similar formulations 
(ἐξ ἀπείρου χρόνου προκατέχεσθαι/ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατεσκευάζετο). We can go even further 
though and confirm the Democritean background by looking at Marcus’ own criticism of the 
atomist. At vii.31, Marcus makes a punning use of Democritus to stress, not accidentally by 
using the language of memory, that all exists by law.  
ἐκεῖνος μέν φησιν ὅτι ῾πάντα νομιστί, ἐτεῇ δὲ μόνα τὰ στοιχεῖἀ’, ἀρκεῖ δὲ μεμνῆσθαι 
ὅτι τὰ πάντα νομιστὶ ἔχει: ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα. 
He (Democritus) says: ‘All (sensibles) are ruled by law, but in reality the elements 
alone exist.’ It is sufficient for you to remember that all exists by law; now there is 
little else.  
 
The text here is somewhat doubtful but the reference to Democritus seems sound enough. The 
distinction between what exists per se (στοιχεῖἀ) and what exists in relation to the senses 
                                                 
76 So Farquharson (n.21), 825, citing Luc., DRN 3.1076.  
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(νομιστί) is well attested77 and the playful use of ‘νομιστί’ to transform Democritus’ sense of 
‘by convention’ to Marcus’ ‘by law’ recalls the earlier mention of Democritus at iii.3. What 
this passage confirms for our purposes is that Marcus understood Democritus along the same 
lines as he portrays the atomist of x.7: halfway towards the right answer. Democritus, in both 
passages, is also a useful source of a lesson on the comprehensiveness of nature’s providential 
reach.78 My suggestion, then, is that limiting Marcus’ criticism in x.7 makes best sense of the 
distinction between rivals positions he opposes and provides a neat solution to the scope of the 
governing disjunction in the text itself, as well as in the argument of these chapters.   
 Yet if Marcus is taking up a limited, providential sort of atomism,79 what is his aim in 
canvassing this non-Stoic option? The account given above of contemplative practice 
interweaving Heraclitean flux with distinctive positions within Stoic debate is again relevant 
in (2) and suggests, one again, the relevance of theoria. This section works by eliciting the 
result of what the dissolution of compounds amounts to on either of the alternatives posed in 
the ‘atoms or providence’ disjunction. If atoms, dissolution means scattering (though not of a 
random sort, if my reading above is accepted); if φύσις, cosmic re-absorption according to the 
Stoic account. However, the Stoic position is sub-divided into two competing interpretations; 
the traditional view of periodic conflagrations repeated on an endless cycle, or the 
understanding of Panaetius, Boethus of Sidon, and perhaps of others, that the world is eternal.80 
The latter is cashed out using strongly Heraclitean language,81 establishing the contemplative 
context and continuing the chain of reasoning.  
                                                 
77 See, for example, Diogenes of Oinanda (fr.vi, Williams): Δημόκριτος τὰς ἀτόμους μόνας 
κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἰπὼν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ νομιστὲι ἅμαντα. Cf. S.E. M.7.135.  
78 In this way, I take it that Marcus’ judgement is along the same lines as what Aristotle holds 
at Physics VIII, 252a32-b5, on Democritus’ failure to establish a strong enough determining 
ἀρχή over and above pointing to what was prior to any given event. On this reading, 
Democritus accepted causal determinism in some form but failed to extend this analysis beyond 
something akin to a theory of regularity; see J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London, 
1982), 430-2.   
79 See iv.27 for another example of a limited sort of atomism being contrasted with providence. 
There the atomist universe is a ‘medley’ (κυκεών) but an ordered one (κόσμος). Contrast vi.10.    
80 See Philo, Aeternitate Mundi ii.497 M (EK F99b). See also SVF iii.27 (Diogenes Bablonius) 
and SVF iii.5 (Zeno Tarsensis). 
81 εἴτε ἀιδίοις ἀμοιβαῖς ἀνανεουμένου, cf. Heraclitus DKB90: πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα 
καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός. The Heraclitean 
formulation of the opposed positions on conflagration is prefigured by τροπή at the start of (2), 
cf. Heraclitus B31a. The Heraclitean flavour of this passage is often noted, but little interpreted; 
see G.S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge, 1962), 337.  
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 It is remarkable that the elements that emerged in our discussion of vi.14-16 
(Heraclitus; the contemplation of change and its ethical role; and the importance of flux both 
as structuring the objects of contemplation, but also us, as humans who contemplate) each has 
parallels here in x.5-7. That final element of continuous human material flux finds a fairly 
radical exploration, from a Stoic point-of-view, in (3) where even the standard Stoic solution 
to the famous ‘Growing Argument’ (which sceptically denies that anything can grow because 
any added element makes the subject into a different individual) is downplayed. Marcus takes 
that standard solution (the ‘peculiarly qualified individual, τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ, which persists 
immaterially, in spite of material flux) and seems to put it off to one side, maintaining but also 
minimising the Stoic position.82   
 The emphasis on the material flux of the person contemplating is found in both vi.15 
and x.7 in similar terms. In the earlier passage, the constant cycle of respiration was 
supplemented by the recent (in cosmic terms) acquisition of the power of respiration itself (ἣν 
χθὲς καὶ πρῴην ἀποτεχθεὶς ἐκτήσω). In (3), the same emphasis on respiration as a 
representative of human material flux as a whole is repeated using overlapping language (πᾶν 
γὰρ τοῦτο ἐχθὲς καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν ἐκ τῶν σιτίων καὶ τοῦ ἑλκομένου ἀέρος τὴν ἐπιρροὴν 
ἔλαβεν).  
What then is the point of underscoring our constant flux as humans in the context of 
examining change in the world? We can begin to see a solution in the last line of our passage. 
The mention of the ‘peculiarly qualified individual’ is made in a near concessive manner: it is 
spite of this commitment that Marcus suggests his present argument works. This places the 
emphasis firmly on the constant change of flux and not on the Stoic solution which attempts to 
unify the person associated with the changing body targeted by the infamous ‘Growing 
Argument’.  
David Sedley suggests that the fluid material self is what Marcus takes to be what we 
really are, as it is this part that is continually distributed and unified with the universe. We can 
sharpen this point by keeping the contemplative context in view. That the objects of 
contemplation are of just the same type as the constitution of the one contemplating helps to 
                                                 
82 This analysis owes a great deal to Sedley’s exposition (n.8), 400-401. Note too that it is both 
the body and the soul that are depicted as undergoing continuous flux. Farquharson (n.21), 396 
takes the ‘peculiarly qualified individual’ to be a concession to the Epicurean view, but this 
seems to ignore Plut. On Common Conceptions 1083c-d. For more on the Stoic response to the 
‘Growing Argument’, see D. Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’, Phronesis 27 (1982), 
255-75, and J. Bowin, ‘Chrysippus' Puzzle About Identity’, OSAP 24 (2003), 239-251.  
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justify the relevance of the practice and suggests that there is little distinction to be made 
between contemplation and self-contemplation: they are mutually entailed, as both the self and 
the external world experience transformation and material flux, both requirements for 
contemplative objects. Thus by emphasising our material flux as humans Marcus not only 
demonstrates the kinship between humans and the external world, he also highlights 
contemplative practice, that feature that makes us peculiarly human in the first place.   
The contemplative context also helps to define what Marcus wishes to gain from 
associating Heraclitean flux with personal identity. In vi.14-16, we saw that Marcus’ appeal to 
Heraclitus figured within the development of a scala naturae with humans, so long as their 
peculiar understanding (ἰδίας διανοίας) was activated, at the top. It is this understanding that I 
take to be the result of contemplation; after all, oikeiosis, taken to be the understanding of 
oneself and one’s relations, is a plausible ethical result of contemplating on the changing world. 
This enquiry need not be of a theoretical or innovative kind, but it must encompass continued 
focus on the material flux and elemental transformation apparent in the cosmos. Thus the 
recognition of the fundamental material flux of both the contemplator and the objects of 
contemplation emphasises Marcus’ ethical commitments, something Marcus is keen to find in 
the practice of theoria.  
Yet we still might wonder quite why the near concession, or at least, seeming 
diminution, of the standard, long-established Stoic understanding of the ‘peculiarly qualified 
individual’ might be seen to affect Marcus’ present argument (πρὸς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον). If the 
aim of this section as a whole is to establish the thoroughgoingness of providential explanation, 
accepting either the Stoic view or a limited form of atomism, the point seems to be that one 
must accept material flux to judge dissolution properly. In this way, flux is important because 
it is on this ground that we ought to consider the options listed above, i.e. atomist scattering, 
conflagration, or eternal renewal. Marcus’ acceptance of the Stoic ‘peculiarly qualified 
individual’ may seem to tone down his commitment to radical flux and subject him to the same 
contradictory surprise and indignation at death he attributes to the Democritean atomist 
discussed above. Marcus denies this and commits himself to the combination of observation 
and rational analysis that characterises Stoic contemplation and is the only means of deciding 
between the three options he lists. If we keep the connection made above between the 
competing understandings of dissolution in viii.25 (both atomistic and Stoic) and the form of 
contemplation described in viii.26, we can see how Marcus intended to arrive at his judgement 
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here in x.83 On such an account, Marcus is very far away indeed from accepting, even ex 
hypothesi, Epicurean atomism.  
 
SOME FINAL DISJUNCTIONS 
We may turn to one last group of instances of the providence/atoms disjunction. Once 
again, these are examples where Marcus seems to derive an ethical conclusion from the 
convergence of apparently opposed ideas. In xii.14-15, three distinct positions are enumerated: 
unalterable destiny, providence admitting intercession, and ungoverned chaos. The desired 
ethical response for each is described in each case suggesting that Marcus is leaving open the 
question of the correct view of the nature of the cosmos. Indeed, he seems to be going one step 
further in listing two different notions of causal determinism, one rigidly structured and one 
open to divine intercession. As in our previous passages, these alternative proposals are 
presumably competing, intra-Stoics position. It is here that Annas, following Asmis, finds 
Marcus’ commitment to the power of his intellect, even in the face of doubt. Thus Marcus’ 
concession is real and in the service of a more fundamental ethical commitment. 
I agree that Marcus’ insistence on the power of his own intellect is fundamental, but I 
also maintain that it would be a mistake to take such a position as prior, in the manner Annas 
and Asmis suggest, to his commitment to Stoic physical principles. The emphasis on the 
intellect is not an attempt to ‘bracket out’ or suspend judgement on claims in Stoic physics. 
What the emphasis on the intellect demonstrates is that Marcus is responding to the very tension 
identified above between one’s seemingly incorrigible experience of the world and one’s view 
upon reflection. It is the intellect that steadies the ship when sailing in deceptive, Heraclitean 
waters: 
ἤτοι ἀνάγκη εἱμαρμένης καὶ ἀπαράβατος τάξις ἢ πρόνοια ἱλάσιμος ἢ φυρμὸς 
εἰκαιότητος ἀπροστάτητος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπαράβατος ἀνάγκη, τί ἀντιτείνεις; εἰ δὲ πρόνοια 
ἐπιδεχομένη τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι, ἄξιον σαυτὸν ποίησον τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θείου βοηθείας. εἰ δὲ 
φυρμὸς ἀνηγεμόνευτος, ἀσμένιζε ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ κλύδωνι αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἐν σαυτῷ τινα 
νοῦν ἡγεμονικόν, κἂν παραφέρῃ σε ὁ κλύδων, παραφερέτω τὸ σαρκίδιον, τὸ 
                                                 
83 Some of the worry commentators have about this passage (see Gill (no.14), lxxiii, who 
references Cooper (n.3) 346-51) is that Marcus appears to raise for examination different 
models of the natural world which support his ethical conclusions without ever making it clear 
why the Stoic position must be adopted. Rather Marcus proceeds as if he has indeed 
demonstrated the Stoic position. Viii.25-26 suggests an answer to Gill, but the larger problem 
with such a worry is that it illicitly expects an explicit argument. If we agree that Marcus is 
writing for himself and his own self-improvement, we should not think he spelled out every 
argument he assented to. On the account I have given, this is where the appeals to memory 
become relevant. Marcus is piecing together the tools he needs to satisfy his own enquiry into 
Stoic philosophy; he is not attempting to persuade a sceptical audience.  
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πνευμάτιον, τἄλλα: τὸν γὰρ νοῦν οὐ παροίσει, ἢ τὸ μὲν τοῦ λύχνου φῶς, μέχρι σβεσθῇ, 
φαίνει καὶ τὴν αὐγὴν οὐκ ἀποβάλλει: ἡ δὲ ἐν σοὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ 
σωφροσύνη προαποσβήσεται; 
Either the necessity of destiny or an order none may transgress, or providence open to 
hearing intercession, or an ungoverned jumble without purpose. If then a necessity 
which cannot be transgressed, why do you resist? If providence open to intercession, 
make yourself worthy of god’s help. If an undirected jumble, be glad that in so great a 
crash of waves you yourself have a directing intellect; and if the waves carry you off, 
let it carry your flesh and your spirit, and all the rest of you; for your intellect it will not 
carry away. Does the lamp-light continue to shine and not lose its radiance until it is 
put out? Are truth and justice and self-control to be put out in you before the end?    
 
Here it seems that the intellect (ἡγεμονικόν) is being privileged and valued on both determinist 
and non-determinist accounts. Regardless of what is the case at the level of physical causation, 
what is important, so this reading goes, is that truth, justice, and self-control (ἀλήθεια καὶ 
δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη) be preserved and Marcus’ ethical perspective left intact. Yet this 
concessive reading is hard to square with how such moral ends could follow. Can ‘truth’ really 
be saved independently of whether Stoic providence is accepted? This is doubtful and it is, in 
any case, an unnecessary question to raise. If we look to two similar passages (ix.28 and ix.39), 
we see that the Marcus’ approach is not concessive or agnostic but rather psychologically 
sensitive, though without any hint of surrender. What he is doing is addressing himself at his 
most unstable and subject to the bombardment of the material flux of the world. His advice to 
himself is to focus on that part to which he has most certain access: the intellect. If he maintains 
his confidence in this, it is not that a desirable ethical perspective will follow regardless of 
one’s commitments in natural philosophy. Rather, because of the intellect, one can find the 
steady ground needed to pursue philosophical enquiry and arrive at a considered position 
unaffected by the surrounding, but only apparent, instability. Such a strategy entails no 
concession to non-Stoic views, but does suggest how one might, with lived experience in mind, 
arrive at the Stoic position 
 At ix.28, we have contemplation explicitly raised as Marcus’ prescription for curing a 
mistaken belief in chance:  
τὸ δ̓ ὅλον, εἴτε θεός, εὗ ἔχει πάντα: εἴτε τὸ εἰκῇ, τρόπον [γὰρ] τινα ἄτομοι ἤ ἀμερῆ, μὴ 
καὶ σὺ εἰκῇ. ἤδη πάντας ἡμᾶς γῆ καλύψει, ἔπειτα καὶ αὐτὴ μεταβαλεῖ κἀκεῖνα εἰς 
ἄπειρον μεταβαλεῖ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα εἰς ἄπειρον. τὰς γὰρ ἐπικυματώσεις τῶν 
μεταβολῶν καὶ ἀλλοιώσεων ἐνθυμούμενός τις καὶ τὸ τάχος παντὸς θνητοῦ 
καταφρονήσει. 
And whether the whole is god, all is well—or whether it be chance, somehow atoms or 
indivisibles, do not be ruled by chance. In a moment earth will cover us all, then earth, 
too, will change and what ensues will to eternity and that again to eternity. For one 
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thinks about the continuous waves of change and alteration, and the swift passage of all 
things mortal, will look upon them with disdain.  
 
A chance-ridden cosmos is not a ‘real choice’ as Annas has it, but is a mere appearance that 
can be eliminated by turning to the practice of examining elemental change and alteration, the 
very description of contemplation’s practice Marcus provides at x.11.84 Ix. 39 continues the 
theme: either there is one fountain of mind (μιᾶς πηγῆς νοερᾶς πάντα) or there is a mechanistic 
world of atoms (κυκεὼν καὶ σκεδασμός). If the latter, Marcus is to say to his hegemonikon: 
‘Are you dead, corrupted, made into a beast, play-acting, part of the herd, feeding with it?’ The 
point is not that two models of the cosmos are offered disinterestedly; it is that accepting one 
of them makes Marcus sub-human in just the same way that beasts who have sense perception 
are said to be on the scala naturae of vi.16.   
Thus there is no evidence here in these passages that Marcus is ‘open’ to the Epicurean 
view. What we find is something to akin to Annas’ mention of the Stoic ‘mixed-presentation’ 
of the three parts of philosophy.85 While we need not agree with her point that Marcus is willing 
to detach himself from Stoic physical and metaphysical claims, it is right to say that Marcus, 
in the face of psychological confusion,86 reminds himself of that which is most immediate and 
accessible.87 As this is determined to be the intellect, it is from this initial step that a foundation 
is laid for further enquiry in the Stoic vein. Marcus is not extending an open hand to 
Epicureanism, he is establishing the route away from its tempting, but misleading, attractions.  
 
                                                 
84 Annas (n.7), 112.  
85 See D.L. 7.39-41.  
86 See τί οὖν ταράσσῃ? at ix.39.  
87 There is something of G.E. Moore’s ‘here is one hand’ in this. As Moore appeals to one’s 
certainty that one is looking at his hand, Marcus falls back on the certainty of his access to his 
hegemonikon. In both cases, the examples are given as more certain than one’s belief in the 
arguments of an opponent. In Moore’s case, the sceptic’s; in Marcus’, the atomist’s.    
